The Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s decision to provide additional public funding for the English national stadium project at Wembley is an example of well managed risk taking, Sir John Bourn, Head of the National Audit Office said today. The Department, working closely with Sport England, has thoroughly reviewed the project and taken appropriate […]
This examines the causes of poor performance on the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern network since the franchise began in September 2014, the effects on passenger services, financial outcomes for the operator and the Department, and the Department’s handling of the Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern franchise.
The programme to upgrade to the Thameslink routes through London has a realistic prospect of delivering value for money but there remains risks which the Department for Transport and Network Rail need to manage carefully.
A third of major government projects due to deliver in the next five years are rated as in doubt or unachievable unless action is taken to improve delivery. Greater transparency on project performance is required.
This report examines the evidence base supporting the decision to proceed with the Thames Tideway Tunnel, a tunnel running 25 kilometres from Acton to Abbey Mills, as well as progress achieved to date.
There is no collective understanding of what type of oversight is appropriate and cost effective for different types of arm’s length bodies.
The case for a huge expansion of electronic monitoring using GPS was unproven, but the Ministry of Justice pursued an overly ambitious and high risk strategy anyway. Ultimately it has not delivered.
The Department has made good progress since we last reported on Carrier Strike, however it still has a lot to do to meet its targets at the end of 2020.
The MoD has developed a strategy that identifies the estate it needs and the 25% of its estate it can dispose of by 2040. However, the strategy and current funding levels allow only for a partial reversal of the decline in the condition of the remaining estate. There is a significant risk that the poor condition of the estate will affect the Department’s ability to provide the defence capability needed.
The Department has committed electricity consumers and taxpayers to a high cost and risky deal in a changing energy marketplace. We cannot say the Department has maximised the chances that it will achieve value for money.
HS2 is a large, complex and ambitious programme which is facing cost and time pressures. The unrealistic timetable set for HS2 Ltd by the Department means they are not as ready to deliver as they hoped to be at this point.
The welfare cap is encouraging a greater understanding of spending on some benefits and tax credits across government, but it is important that processes for managing the cap are reliable.
The incentives on government Accounting Officers to prioritise value for money are weak compared to those associated with the day-to-day job of satisfying Ministers.
An update report by the NAO identifies that the government has secured gains of £137 million from PFI debt refinancings under new arrangements introduced by the Treasury in 2002. These new arrangements followed previous reports by the NAO and the Public Accounts Committee that highlighted the opportunities for the private sector to benefit from refinancing […]