Military flying training
Published on:The new military flying training is 6 years delayed and there is much to do if the MoD is to get the planned benefits from its contractor.
The new military flying training is 6 years delayed and there is much to do if the MoD is to get the planned benefits from its contractor.
The MOD decision to reduce the size of the regular Army and increase the number of trained Army reserves was taken without appropriate testing of feasibility or evaluation of risk.
We publish our examination of the assumptions made by the MOD in its annual statement of its 10-year equipment plan.
The MOD is buying more inventory than it uses and not consistently disposing of stock it no longer needs using money that could be spent elsewhere.
The NAO has today issued a supplementary report on the Carrier Strike project, having been given access to briefing papers held by the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
Action taken by the Ministry of Defence to balance its overall budget in the short term following the Strategic Defence and Security Review has contributed to a near £500 million in-year cost increase in the 15 largest defence projects.
The Ministry of Defence, under pressure to make rapid financial savings, is significantly reducing the size of its workforce, by over 54,000 personnel. A report today by the National Audit Office has found that these reductions are happening in advance of the Department’s fully understanding how it will operate with significantly fewer staff.
This Departmental Overview is one of 17 we have produced covering our work on each major government department. It summarises our work on the Ministry of Defence during 2010-2011.
This memorandum has been prepared to support the Committee of Public Accounts’ consideration of the Ministry of Defence’s provision of accommodation to its service personnel.
The NAO has published its report on the 2010-11 accounts of the Ministry of Defence.
Changes to the aircraft carrier project in the 2010 defence review will save £3.4 billion but leave the UK without carrier capability for nine years.
The suspension and cancellation of a number of key armoured vehicle projects since the 1998 defence review has resulted in the Armed Forces facing a significant shortage in the principal armoured vehicles they require, until at least 2024-2025.
MOD’s procurement budget is now more stable, despite a £754m increase in the cost of the carriers, but there are still risks to the affordability of the equipment plan.
The cost of each Typhoon aircraft has risen by 75 per cent. While Typhoon performs some defence tasks now, it won’t take on all roles until 2018.
The MOD supply chain is currently not value for money. It would be much more efficient if directed by a modern information system.
The Ministry of Defence does not place sufficient emphasis on financial management in its decision making. Annual financial plans at the MOD have been over-committed. During 2009-10 the Department had to find additional savings of £800 million to bring its planned expenditure back into line with its budgets.
The MOD have been unable to provide evidence to support the existence and value of certain assets and inventory balances. In addition, the Department’s accounting policies are not fully compliant with International Financial Reporting Standards.
The MOD, one of the largest landowners in the UK, has strengthened its estate planning and achieved significant receipts from disposal of property. However, the changes are not yet sufficient to drive value for money for the taxpayer rigorously.
The MOD acted promptly to revert to the decision to buy the vertical take-off version of the Joint Strike Fighter but will have to manage significant risks.
Central Departmental decisions by the Ministry of Defence to try to balance the defence budget have reduced its cash-flow requirements in the short-term but at a long-term cost that represents poor value for money for the taxpayer.